candycrushsagaforpc| How to understand the logic and impact of the simultaneous rise in gold prices, U.S. bond interest rates and U.S. dollar exchange rates?
来源：中金固定收益研究
摘要
2024年3月以来，黄金、铜、石油等重要商品价格出现较大涨幅，我们认为背后的根本因素或是市场担忧美元信用削弱，导致以美元计价的商品、特别是供应偏紧的品种价格上涨。但同时美股在人工智能等带动下表现仍强，叠加财政支出仍高，美国经济仍展现韧性并制约美联储转向宽松，因此出现candycrushsagaforpc了黄金价格、美债利率和美元汇率同涨的局面。
美元信用削弱或受近年美国财政大幅扩张及货币大幅超发拖累
美国利息支出负担较重易引发对美国偿债能力下滑担忧。新冠疫情后美国政府大量举债，特朗普和拜登两届任期内增加的美债共占全部美债的四成以上。叠加此前美联储大幅加息，美国政府的利息支出直线上升。无论从绝对规模、占财政收入的比重还是与其他财政支出的比较来看，当前美国政府的利息支出负担均已较重。而这可能加重市场对美债偿付能力的担忧，进而加剧对美元的不信任。
大量举债及高利率环境下，美国财政和贸易双赤字“后遗症”显现。双赤字或也会加剧美元信用下降。在经济、军事和科技力量支持下，美国因双赤字输出的资金往往能通过对美企在全球获得的利润征税及资本流入而回流到美国，因此市场通常不会怀疑美国的偿债能力和美元的购买能力。但当通胀导致美国利率持续上升时，美国利息负担越来越重，难免令市场担心美国国债的偿付能力下滑。特别是美债投资者中海外投资者占比较高，一旦海外投资者担心美国国债的偿付能力，可能就会转向其他可替代物并要求美国国债支付更高的利息水平来平衡未来的偿付风险，在此情况下，海外央行可能会逐步增持黄金、降低对美债的配比。
地缘政治环境及美企竞争力相对变化或会加剧市场对美国偿付能力担忧。近期地缘政治局势变化以及美国企业在全球产业链上的竞争力相对下降可能也是对美国国债偿付能力担忧的触发因素。因此，我们一方面看到在人工智能带动下美股持续创新高，但另一方面也看到黄金价格一定程度上受到市场对美元信用下滑担忧的影响而持续创新高。这相当于市场同时在信任美国和不信任美国两个维度下注。但拉长趋势来看，我们认为后者影响可能加强并在中短期内进一步推高以美元定价的商品价格，使得美国陷入“美元信用削弱-以美元定价商品价格上涨-通胀韧性加强-美债利率维持高位-美国利息负担加重-美债偿付风险提升-美元信用削弱”的恶性循环。
“三高”背景下，美国经济和股市最终或会逐渐走弱，届时可能迎来美联储降息并促使股市资金流向债市
高油价、高利率和高工资往往会导致美国企业盈利收缩，并导致经济和股市下滑，我们认为此次可能也不例外。从未来两三个季度来看，我们认为前述恶性循环短期内可能会持续，进而使得美国经济和股市再次冷却，届时美联储更易开启降息。同时若美国股市下滑，那么股票投资者可能转向配置债券并有助于压低美债利率。
美债利率或先升后降，黄金价格或仍有上涨空间，风险资产或需谨慎对待
总体而言，我们认为短期内美债利率或仍会回升，三季度或会逐步回落，前提是股市出现相对明显的调整。当前美欧股市估值偏高，叠加全球经济和地缘政治不确定性上升，股市未来调整的风险可能会增加、或需谨慎对待。而美国国债或可以等待利率进一步上升、尤其是美股出现较明显跌幅后再增配，毕竟美债供给仍高，因此或需股票投资者增持债券来帮助压低利率，而增持前提可能就是股市下跌触发资产配置需求转移。其他资产方面，我们较看好黄金上涨空间，若美国偿债能力有下降风险则可能促使投资者进一步增持黄金。而原油、有色、黑色等商品短期内不排除价格进一步走高，但考虑到价格走高也会反向抑制需求，上涨空间可能相对有限；同时若未来美欧需求收缩，也会带动价格高位回落。至于中国债券，在全球经济需求开始下滑的背景下，避险逻辑或会进一步压低中国债券利率，尤其是外需若下滑也会对经济有一定拖累，我们认为未来国内货币政策可能还将进一步放松，可以继续增配国内债券。
风险
美国通胀超预期回落，美联储货币政策超预期宽松。
正文
2024年3月份以来，黄金、铜、石油等重要商品价格出现了一轮较大的上涨，一定程度上也是美国3月份CPI超预期回升的推手。但我们认为这一轮商品价格上涨的背后，可能并不完全是整体工业需求明显增加引发的，也不完全是预期美联储降息进而带来流动性宽松引发的。虽然一些供给扰动（比如石油减产，中国铜冶炼减产等）能局部解释，但可能也不是最核心的原因。从历史来看，在过去较长的一段时间内，黄金价格和美元指数是负相关的，而近期黄金价格却在美元指数仍然较强的情况下也大幅上涨（图1）。究其根本因素，我们认为可能是市场对美元本身的不信任上升，导致了以美元计价的商品价格上涨，尤其是供应偏紧的品种。但与此同时，美股在人工智能等带动下表现仍强，叠加财政支出力度未明显下降，美国经济仍展现韧性，并对美联储转向宽松形成制约，因此出现了黄金价格、美元利率和美元汇率同涨的局面。
图表1：近期黄金价格与美元指数同涨
注：数据截至2024年3月
资料来源：Bloomberg，中金公司研究部
美元信用削弱或受近年美国财政大幅扩张及货币大幅超发拖累
美国利息支出负担较重易引发对美国偿债能力下滑担忧
新冠疫情爆发后，美国政府为支持多轮大规模刺激计划持续大量发债。虽然从历史情况来看，美国经常处于财政赤字状态、财政盈余时期较少，导致美国国债规模不断增加（图2），但历任总统任职期间的举债规模都不及近两届（图3）。截至2024年4月11日，美国国债余额为34candycrushsagaforpc.56万亿美元。而在其中，特朗普任期内（2017年1月20日至2021年1月19日）产生的美国国债增量为7.85亿美元、占当前全部美债余额的22.7%；拜登截至目前的任期内（2021年1月20日至今）产生的美债增量为6.78万亿美元、占全部美债余额的19.6%，二者合计占到美债余额的四成以上。
图表2：美国国债余额
注：数据截至2024年4月10日
资料来源：iFinD，中金公司研究部
图表3：历届任期内美国国债余额增量
注：历届任期为任期首年1月20日至末年1月19日，当前任期截至2024年4月10日；横轴坐标为任期首年
资料来源：iFinD，中金公司研究部
叠加此前美联储大幅快速加息，大量举债的后果之一就是美国政府的国债利息支出直线上升。从净利息支出（政府支付的全部利息支出减去其所持国债的利息收入）的维度来看，截至2024年3月，美国联邦政府净利息支出规模的连续12个月累计值已高达7873亿美元、为历史新高（图4）。与此同时，美国利息支出占财政收入的比重也大幅提高，截至2024年3月，近12个月净利息支出占近12个月财政收入的比重已升至17.2%，同样处于历史高位（图5）。此外，从与其他财政支出分项相比，近12个月净利息支出已经超过收入保障支出、并逼近国防支出，而从近3个月数据来看净利息支出甚至已经超过国防支出（图6、7）。从经济和法理上来说，国债本金可以借新还旧，但利息是需要通过财政收入来偿还的，因此存在一个理论上的极限，如果财政收入增长明显落后于利息支出增长，那么利息支出压力就会越来越大，甚至可能出现旁氏骗局，而当前美国财政收入增速远不及利息支出增速（图8）。此外，若从不考虑利息收入抵扣的总利息支出来看，这一数值同样大幅上升，截至2024年3月，近12个月累计的总利息支出已经升至1.02万亿美元（图9），同期美国财政赤字规模为1.66万亿美元。综合多个维度来看，当前美国利息支出负担已经较重。而这可能加重市场对美债偿付能力的担忧，进而加剧对美元的不信任。
图表4：美国净利息支出大幅增加
注：数据截至2024年3月
资料来源：CEIC，中金公司研究部
图表5：美国净利息支出占财政收入比重升至历史高位
注：数据截至2024年3月；净利息支出与财政收入均为近12个月累计值
资料来源：CEIC，中金公司研究部
图表6：美国各项财政支出（近12个月累计值）
注：数据截至2024年3月
资料来源：CEIC，中金公司研究部
图表7：2024年3月美国各项财政支出
图表8：美国财政收入增速不及净利息支出增速
注：数据截至2024年3月；净利息支出与财政收入增速均使用其近12个月累计值计算
资料来源：CEIC，中金公司研究部
图表9：美国不考虑利息收入抵扣的总利息支出同样升至历史高位
注：数据截至2024年3月
资料来源：haver，中金公司研究部
大量举债及高利率环境下，美国财政和贸易双赤字“后遗症”显现
双赤字或也会加剧美元信用下降。一般而言，出现双赤字意味着一国需要通过借债来消费，但却无法产生足够的盈利来偿还负债。与部分拉美国家类似，美国也是常年“财政+贸易”双赤字的国家。而从历史经验来看，经历过双赤字和债务风险问题的部分拉美国家均出现过经济、汇率和股市的下滑：
墨西哥
在1975年之前，墨西哥的赤字规模整体不大，占GDP的比重在多数时间低于2%。不过随着该国石油探明储量明显增加，政府对石油工业基础设施投入了大量资金，石油预期收入的上升也使得公共部门扩大了对卫生和教育等其他领域的投入，政府赤字规模出现大幅增长（图10）。在财政赤字大幅增加的同时，经常账户赤字也有所增加，占GDP比重从1960-1973年平均2.1%上升至1975年的4.5%，1980年和1981年分别达5.1%和6.2%[1]。彼时外汇收入已不能有效弥补赤字，外债规模相应增加（图11）。1980年代初，石油价格转为下跌，石油收入的减少使得公共财政状况进一步恶化，1981年基本赤字率高达7.6%，此时对财政政策可持续性的担忧开始增加，货币贬值和资本流出预期抬升，外债仅能以更短期限获得。同时，1970年代末以来美联储的加息进程也大幅推升了利率水平，加重了墨西哥债务的付息以及再融资负担，助推比索贬值，使得外债规模急剧增加，占GDP比重从 20%左右跃升至1982年的近60%，而同年墨西哥的（非黄金）外汇储备规模大幅下降（当年同比下降80%），最终墨西哥政府无力偿付外债，不得不于8月宣布无法偿还债务本金，从而发生债务危机。
图表10：墨西哥政府赤字规模
Note: compared with the total deficit, the primary deficit takes into account oil revenue, so the deficit is smaller; data from Meza, Felipe, The Monetary and Fiscal History of Mexico: 1960-2017 (August 9, 2018). University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2018-64
Source: Meza&Felipe (2018), China International Capital Corporation Research Department
Figure 11: scale of government debt at home and abroad in Mexico
Note: data are from Meza, Felipe, The Monetary and Fiscal History of Mexico: 1960-2017 (August 9, 2018). University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2018-64
Source: Meza&Felipe (2018), China International Capital Corporation Research Department
Brazil
After Mexico announced that it could not repay its debt in 1982, Latin American countries, including Brazil, experienced a serious debt crisis. In 1970, Brazil entered the process of industrialization, and the domestic economic growth rate rose rapidly. In 1976, the GDP growth rate rose to 10%. However, due to the low domestic savings rate and the insufficient scale of corporate investment, Brazil needed to rely on a large amount of borrowing to meet the investment demand. During this period, Brazil's debt increased significantly, and Brazil's foreign debt grew at more than 20% (figure 12). The scale of foreign debt increased from US $6 billion in 1970 to US $55 billion in 1978. The government's fiscal deficit is rising rapidly. In addition, interest payments in Brazil rose with the outbreak of the oil crisis in 1973, when interest rates were raised sharply around the world, and Brazil, as an oil importer, was hit and its trade deficit widened, which rose to US $4.7 billion in 1974 (figure 13). As Brazil's debt grew, the Brazilian government increased the issuance of government bonds to cover the deficit, and with the outbreak of the Latin American debt crisis that began with Mexico, there was a massive outflow of foreign capital, and Brazil's balance of payments fell to-$33.4 billion in 1982 (figure 14). The Brazilian government needs to borrow more to repay its debt, causing hyperinflation. As a result, the Brazilian economy fell into recession. In 1981, Brazil's GDP growth rate dropped to-4.25%. Brazil's broad consumer price index (IPCA) grew by more than 100% year-on-year since 1981 and reached a historical record of 6821% in April 1990. The government has started the process of raising interest rates to combat inflation, which has also led to high interest payments, further exacerbating the risk of national debt. On the whole, due to the perennial foreign borrowing of the Brazilian government, the problem of fiscal deficit has become more serious and the risk level of national debt debt has risen rapidly. at the same time, with fiscal expansion, the country has fallen into high inflation, high interest payments and external shocks, resulting in a large outflow of foreign capital, which has brought about a series of problems such as the devaluation of the Brazilian currency and the economic downturn.
In the 1990s, with a series of reform measures taken by the Brazilian government, the Brazilian economy returned to growth. However, in 1994, the Brazilian government implemented the "real plan" to curb inflation, that is, adopting a high interest rate policy and a "fixed exchange rate system", which once again plunged Brazil into a trade deficit. Brazil's trade balance changed from US $10.4 billion in 1994 to-US $3.4 billion in 1995. At this time, the scale of the Brazilian government's foreign debt continued to rise sharply, and since 1992, the growth rate of Brazil's foreign debt balance has risen rapidly. by the end of 1998, Brazil's foreign debt balance has reached 242 billion US dollars, and the central government's fiscal deficit accounts for about 7 percent of GDP. In 1998, with the Asian financial crisis and the Russian financial crisis, Brazil's financial markets also experienced huge shocks at the same time. The Brazilian government's announcement of the delay in debt repayment undermined market confidence. The growth rate of GDP fell back to around 0%, and the massive withdrawal of foreign investment also consumed a lot of Brazil's foreign exchange reserves. In early 1999, Brazil announced the introduction of a floating exchange rate system and borrowed heavily from international organizations, which caused the Brazilian exchange rate to plummet.
In 2013, Brazil again had a double fiscal and trade deficit. On the one hand, due to the large scale of Brazilian pension expenditure, the government's fiscal deficit has become increasingly serious. In 2014, Brazil's fiscal deficit accounted for about 6% of GDP, and for the first time there was a central government-level budget deficit. In 2016, Brazil's fiscal deficit reached the highest level in nearly 20 years, and the scale of foreign debt further increased. On the other hand, as the global economic recovery slows, commodity prices are under pressure, Brazilian export growth slows, ending a 12-year trade surplus and the current account deficit worsens, falling to minus $110.5 billion in 2014. At that time, Brazil's economic growth slowed to 0.5%, and in the following two years it was negative. The recession aggravated the government's fiscal deficit and led to high inflation and currency depreciation. Brazil's IPCA index rose significantly from 2015 to 10.7% in the first quarter of 2016, the highest level since 2004. In order to curb inflation, domestic benchmark interest rates have risen again, causing household consumption and business investment to fall into the doldrums. At the same time, the United States began to gradually withdraw from the policy of quantitative easing, the global risk appetite declined, and the exchange rate of the US dollar rose, which led to the relative depreciation of the Brazilian currency and the massive outflow of foreign capital, which further had a certain impact on the foreign exchange market and the financial market.
Figure 12: growth of Brazil's external debt balance
Note: data as of 2022
Figure 13: Brazil's trade balance
Note: data as of 2023
Figure 14: Brazil's balance of payments
Note: data as of 2023
Figure 15: Brazil's fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP
Note: data as of 2022
Figure 16: Brazilian stock market index trend
Argentina
One of the more serious debt crises in Argentina occurred in 2001-2002. Due to long-term high fiscal expenditure, the Argentine government authorities need to continue to increase debt to cover the fiscal deficit, and its limited domestic funds have led to the majority of Argentina's external debt. However, the foreign debt borrowed by Argentina has not been effectively used for economic construction. As its domestic fiscal deficit has intensified, inflation and unemployment remain high, foreign confidence in Argentina has weakened and there has been an outflow, while Argentina is highly dependent on foreign debt. as a result, the outflow of foreign capital has intensified the financing pressure on Argentina. Superimposed by the global economic slowdown, Argentina's trade situation is not optimistic, the economy has fallen sharply. At the end of 2001, the three major international rating agencies downgraded Argentina's international credit rating one after another, which further led to a decline in Argentine bond prices and a rapid rise in financing costs. Finally, as external financing tightened, the Argentine Government faced payment difficulties, declared a default on its debt in late 2001 and abandoned its "convertibility scheme" pegged to the United States dollar in January 2002 (1:1 of the Argentine peso and the United States dollar). The debt crisis has plunged the Argentine economy into chaos, including a sharp devaluation of the currency (figure 19), high inflation and recession.
Figure 17: Argentina's fiscal deficit as a share of GDP
Note: data as of 2023
Source: haver, China International Capital Corporation Research Department
Chart 18: Argentina's current account balance as a proportion of GDP
Note: data as of 2023
Source: haver, China International Capital Corporation Research Department
Chart 19: after abandoning the convertibility program in 2002, the Argentine peso depreciated sharply
Chart 20: Argentine stock index fell in 2001
The United States itself is also in a state of double deficit all the year round (figure 21), but unlike the above-mentioned Latin American countries, with the support of economic, military, scientific and technological forces, American companies can get rich returns around the world. and sent back to the US government through taxes. At the same time, it can also balance the negative impact of double deficits through strong capital inflows. In other words, although the United States is also in a state of double deficit, the United States has a "replenishment" mechanism, which means that the funds exported from the double deficit can be returned to the United States, thus balancing exchange rate pressure and financial pressure. Therefore, when the US economy, military and science and technology are strong enough, the market generally will not doubt the debt repayment ability of the United States and the purchasing ability of the US dollar. This may also be the reason why the depreciation of the US dollar is more reflected in the depreciation of commodities than against other currencies, that is, the so-called inflation, after the large amount of QE and fiscal expansion in the United States after the epidemic.
Chart 21: the United States is in a perennial state of double deficit
Note: data as of 2023
Source: iFinD, China International Capital Corporation Research Department
Figure 22: the depreciation of the dollar may be more reflected in the depreciation of commodities.
Note: the dollar index is the monthly average, as of April 11, 2024, and CPI as of March 2024.
Source: iFinD, China International Capital Corporation Research Department
When inflation brings about a sustained rise in US interest rates, a more obvious "sequela" begins to emerge, that is, the increasing interest burden on US finance. And when the interest burden continues to rise rapidly, the market will inevitably start to worry about the solvency of US Treasuries. After all, US treasury bonds are different from Japanese treasury bonds, most of which are held by domestic financial institutions and held by foreign investors, and the interest rate of Japanese treasury bonds is very low, so although the proportion of Japanese treasury bonds in GDP is significantly higher than that of the United States, the current pressure on the repayment of principal and interest on Japanese debt may not be as high as that of the United States. A high proportion of US Treasuries are held by foreign investors (figure). As of January 2024, foreign investors held US $8.02 trillion, accounting for 23.5 per cent of total US debt and 29.6 per cent of US debt held by the public (figure 23). Not only that, many central banks use US Treasuries as reserve assets, and once foreign investors worry about the solvency of US Treasuries, they may turn to other alternatives and require US Treasuries to pay higher interest rates to balance future repayment risks. in this case, overseas central banks may gradually increase their holdings of gold and reduce their allocation to US bonds.
Figure 23: proportion of overseas investors in US Treasuries
Note: data as of January 2024
Source: iFinD, China International Capital Corporation Research Department
From our observation, the scale of gold held by global central banks has increased significantly since 2022 (figure 24). The people's Bank of China is an important force in gold demand, accounting for 43% of the increase in gold holdings by global central banks since 2022H2, and the proportion of gold in foreign exchange reserves has further risen to an all-time high of about 4.3%, but it is still far lower than economies such as the United States, the euro zone, the United Kingdom and India. There is room for further improvement. In addition, the central banks of Turkey and Poland are also the main buyers. It is worth noting that there has also been a significant increase in global central bank gold purchases between 2018 and 2019, and the overall scale is higher than the current level, but at that time, the sharp increase in central bank gold holdings was mainly driven by Central and Eastern Europe, 2018H2 to 2019H1, global central bank gold reserves increased by 718 tons, of which Russia accounted for nearly 40%, Russia, Poland and Turkey accounted for more than 60%, and other central banks bought relatively small amounts of gold. This time, the people's Bank of China is more involved, and the economies that increase their gold holdings are relatively more diversified. So the recent rise in gold prices can be understood to a large extent as concerns about the solvency of US Treasuries and a decline in confidence in the dollar itself. In fact, the size of global gold ETF (in terms of physical gold) has been in a state of net decline for most of the first half of 2021 and remains so against the backdrop of rising gold prices in 2023 (figure 26), reflecting that the previous rise in gold prices may not have been driven by traditional allocation forces, but is more likely to be increased holdings by global central banks and by trading investors such as hedge funds in this context.
Figure 24: changes in gold holdings by regional central banks (semi-annual)
Note: data as of December 2023
Source: world Gold Council, China International Capital Corporation Research Department
Chart 25: total changes in gold holdings by regional central banks from January to February over the years
Note: data as of February 2024
Source: world Gold Council, China International Capital Corporation Research Department
Figure 26: net increase in global gold ETF size (in terms of physical gold held)
Note: the data frequency is half-yearly, and the data of 2024H1 as of March 2024
Source: world Gold Council, China International Capital Corporation Research Department
Figure 27: cumulative changes in gold price and gold ETF scale
Note: data as of March 2024
Source: world Gold Council, China International Capital Corporation Research Department
Relative changes in the geopolitical environment and the competitiveness of US companies may exacerbate market concerns about US solvency
In addition, recent geopolitical changes and the relative decline in the competitiveness of US companies in the global industrial chain may also be triggers of concerns about the solvency of US Treasuries. In the field of new energy vehicles, for example, Chinese automakers have become more competitive, while Apple has abandoned its car-building plans, and Tesla's sales have begun to decline, causing its share price to fall. These events have partly led investors to focus on whether the ability of US companies and the US government to make profits in global markets is beginning to decline, and then worry about whether it may make it more difficult to repay debt in the future.
Therefore, on the one hand, we see that the US stock market has continued to hit new highs since last year, or it reflects the market's trust in the technological revolution of artificial intelligence in the United States, but on the other hand, we also see that the price of gold continues to hit record highs. This may reflect the market's mistrust that the United States continues to rely on debt expansion to drive its economy but is faced with the current debt-driven model. This is equivalent to the market betting on both trust and mistrust, which is why liquidity has not eased significantly this time, but it has also seen a rise in risky assets and safe-haven assets at the same time (figure 28).
Figure 28: recent rise in risky assets and gold
Note: data as of March 2024
Source: Bloomberg, China International Capital Corporation Research Department
However, looking at the lengthening trend, we believe that mistrust of the US debt-driven model may further push up the prices of commodities priced in US dollars in the short to medium term, and the prices of important goods such as gold, oil and copper may also rise. this may increase the resilience of US inflation and make it more difficult for the Federal Reserve to cut interest rates, which may lead to higher US interest rates and continue to increase the debt burden of the United States. This in turn exacerbates concerns about the solvency of US debt and mistrust of the US dollar, which in turn further pushes up commodity prices, that is, falling into a vicious circle of "weakening US dollar credit-rising commodity prices priced in dollars-stronger inflation resilience, keeping interest rates high on US debt-increasing interest burden on US debt-increasing risk of US debt repayment-weakening US dollar credit".
Under the background of "three highs", the US economy and stock market may eventually weaken gradually, which may lead to a rate cut by the Federal Reserve and promote the flow of stock market funds to the bond market.
Historically, high oil prices, high interest rates and high wages have often led to a contraction in American corporate profits. after all, the "three highs" mean higher costs for enterprises. Therefore, in the "three highs" environment, the US economy and stock market tend to decline, and this may be the same situation.
As we mentioned in "the game between supply and demand of US debt and inflation continues, interest rates rise in the short term and fall in the long term", historically, high oil prices, high interest rates and high wages often lead to a contraction in US corporate profits. On the one hand, high interest rates and high oil prices will restrain corporate investment and physical demand to a certain extent, on the other hand, the rise in wage expenditure and financing interest rates will also lead to an upward trend in corporate costs, which will eventually put pressure on its profitability. For example, in 2018, in the context of a significant tightening of US monetary policy, US Treasury interest rates rose sharply, while international oil prices climbed to a higher level due to geopolitical factors, and non-farm wage growth also increased at that time. In the "three highs" environment, corporate revenues are under pressure, financing costs are rising, and the EPS of S & P 500 companies has fallen sharply from a year earlier (figure 30). Similarly, in 2022, the "three highs" situation reappeared, corporate profits were damaged again, and EPS declined compared with the same period last year. In addition, there was a similar environment around 2000 and around 2007, when corporate profits also fell significantly, of course, when the bursting of the bubble after the over-booming stock market had a greater impact on the economy and EPS. Therefore, in the "three high" environment, the US economy and stock market tend to decline, although the erosion of corporate profits may be relatively limited for the time being, but over time, the impact of these factors on the economy may be apparent.
Figure 29: oil prices, US Treasury interest rates and non-farm wage growth
Note: data as of March 2024
Source: Wind, China International Capital Corporation Research Department
Figure 30: EPS of the S & P 500
Note: data as of March 2024
Source: Bloomberg, China International Capital Corporation Research Department
Therefore, in the next two or three quarters, we think that in the end, distrust of the American model will overwhelm trust in the advantages of artificial intelligence, which in turn will cause the US economy and stock market to cool again, eventually leading to a fall in corporate profits, demand and prices. In this case, it is more likely to see the Fed start to cut interest rates. In other words, the vicious circle may continue in the short term, and US inflation and interest rates may rise in the short term, forcing the US economy and stock market to cool down. If the US stock market falls, equity investors could turn to allocating bonds and help drive down interest rates on US Treasuries.
Us debt interest rates may rise first and then fall, gold prices may still have room to rise, and risky assets may need to be treated with caution.
Overall, we believe that US bond interest rates may rise further in the short term and may gradually fall back again at the beginning of the third quarter, provided there is a relatively significant correction in the stock market. At present, the valuations of US and European stock markets are on the high side, the global economic and geopolitical uncertainty increases, and the risk of future stock market adjustment may increase, so it is not recommended to continue to add, or even consider reducing holdings. On the other hand, US Treasuries may be allocated gradually after a further rise in interest rates, especially after a relatively obvious decline in US stocks. After all, the supply of US Treasuries is still high this year, and bond investors alone may not be able to hold down interest rates. Therefore, equity investors may also be required to increase their holdings of bonds, and the premise of increasing holdings may be that the decline in the stock market in the United States and Europe triggers the transfer of demand for asset allocation.
In terms of other large categories of assets, we are still optimistic about the rising space for gold. After all, if there is a risk of a decline in the solvency of the United States, then the allocation value of US Treasuries as foreign exchange reserves may decline. In turn, global central banks and residents may further increase their holdings of gold. At the same time, due to the small use of the gold industry, even if the price rises more, it will not cause social conflicts, and it will not affect the production of enterprises and the lives of residents because of the rise too much, so there is a lot of room for imagination about the rising rate of gold. While commodities for industrial use, such as crude oil, non-ferrous, black and other commodities, do not rule out further higher prices (including geopolitical uncertainty) in the short term, but considering that higher prices will also inversely dampen demand, the room for rise may be relatively limited, and if demand from the United States and Europe shrinks in the future, commodity prices for industrial use may eventually fall back high. As for Chinese bonds, in the context of the decline in global economic demand, although there are some recent transmission pressures of rising global prices, the risk aversion logic may also further depress Chinese bond interest rates. in particular, if external demand falls, it will also have a certain impact on the economy at the macro level. We believe that domestic monetary policy may be further relaxed in the future and domestic bonds can continue to be allocated.
Chart 31:S&P500 forward PE
Note: as of April 10, 2024
Source: Reuters, China International Capital Corporation Research Department
Chart 32:Bloomberg US Financial conditions Index
Note: as of April 10, 2024; a high value means looser.
Source: Bloomberg, China International Capital Corporation Research Department
Tags:
Prev: bestonlinerouletterealmoney| "A gold bracelet has increased by almost 10,000 yuan"! The difference between the recycling price and the gold price is nearly 200 yuan/gram
Next: bigtigerbaccarat|油脂市场震荡偏弱：美豆出口疲软、USDA偏空及棕榈油相对抗跌